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CHAPTER XI
CONCLUSION AN1) PERSPECTIVE
(1) At the end of a long and protractel investigationa few words
of comment and interpretation of the whole schemeof thingsare in
order. Author and reader together shouldascertain what wasi-
tended and what has been accomplished. The firstquestion raised
by reader and critic is usually why this particulartype of study
'as made and not another onea legitimatequery when there
are many possible approaches, and when the field isnew and no
well circumscribed. Yet the question is also futik,since, in order
to make a valid statement, alternative studies wouldhave to be
available with which to makea comparison. lhev are not; ilfl(l
because of the difficulty residing with the(lataor rather their
lackconjectures regarding the nature and theoutcome of such
studies are extremely hazardous. It would howeverbe appropriate
to ask whether we have squeezed all possibleinformation from
the data we used. Theanswer to this is clearly in the negative; in
fact we have repeatedly indicated thata deeper exploration of the
material used in the )reccding chaptersis perfectly feasible. On
the other handany procedure using far more refined statistical and
mathematical methods would requirea preliminary survey such
as this one attempts to he. Thuswe can state as the first considera-
tion that our study should have y'ieldt'da tool for further use, and
may incidentally also have producedsome directly useful insights
into the relationships between businesscycles and financial Opera-
tions in important countriesover a significant perio(l. We hope
this has actually been accomplished-we also hope that additional
studies will be undertakennow that the ground has been pre-
pared.
Since in Chapter Iour methodological position was dearly set
forth and at the end of eachsubsequent chapter the successive
results were sllmmarjze(lsometimes in specialtal)k's(ci.,for
example, Tables 20, 21, 40, 70. 9:3,136, 1:38, and 1:39). it isnecessary
only to interpret the wholein order to give relevance to time partial
findings. Clearly thescope of problems outlined in Chapter 1 is far
larger than the actualinvestigation aimed for. The fact thatwe did
less than was mappedtiumt as the comprehensive 1)rollemwas in
part due to the relativeease or (lifficultV of obtaining the data, to
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the coherenceof the data from the point of view of some guiding
theoretical or atleast commonsense principles, anu 'ast but not
least, tothe physical bulk of even the limited study at chosen
level ofdetail. Thus had we been satisfied with yearly or even
quarterly data, with summaryindexes, with rather sweeping verbal,
hjstorical accounts, etc., a'broader and, from many standpoints, more
satisfying picturecould have been drawn. However the detail into
which the investigationwent was chosen deliberately, because only
at thislevel of finenesscould some of the classically postulated
relationshipS amongthe economic quantities in question betested.
These "tests"furthermore are themselves far fromexhaustive if one
bears inmind what presentstatistical technology could accomplish.
(2) The studycovered a period including theprincipal time
of the effective,classical gold standard and the timeafter World
War I when it wasstill in use, though in asomewhat watered-down
fashion. Thesystems of bothperiods, though not identical, are
vastly differentfrom the monctaly systemsand government policies
that sprang upafter World War 11.Yet one of the primaryobserva-
tions madetime and againin the precedingchapters is that even
World War Ibrought about suchbehavioral changes as tomake
it virtuallyimpossible to extendtheoretical explanationssay, of
the interactionamong interestrates from oneof these periods to
any otherperiod. Contacts betweencountries have becomeloose,
no doubtbecause oftheir governments'policies, their cravingfor
"independeflCe" andpossibly becauseof a substantialshift in the
center ofgravity of economicpower. Theobservation ofthe
loosening of contact,i.e., in termsof the tight contactsbefore 1914,
holds for everysingle field inwhich comparativebehavior was
studied. The testfor randomness,applied to thebusiness cycle
as awhole (ChapterII, section2), is conclusivenot onlyfor the
aggregate movementSbut alsoapplies for eachseparate areastudied
thereafter. The verysimplicity of thetest, bothlogically as well as
computati0allY makesthis resultthe more secure.
Though it is
not surprisingwe floWhaveconrmati0h1 that atheory ofthe
international spreadof businesscycles isbound to beof exeptioflal
difficulty, at least asfar as economictheory notionsof difficulty
go. Theobserved breakin thebehavior of ourseries occursfor a
time whenonly minorchangesoccurred inthe monetaryand
economicorganizationof our fourcountries. Butwe knowthat
for other timesand othercountries therewere,and are nOW,very
different formsof organiztiofl;but forthese toothere arerecorch
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of business fluctuations and even cycles, and thereis ndotiht that there also were contacts among the countriesto which thoseoh. servations pertain. In view of this it nidy well be thatfor a long
time to come more is to be expected fromverbal-historjcjiaccounts and statistical-historical investigations dealingwithpartjclllarh. noteworthy instances of simultaneous crisesor suspected &an
mission of disturbances than from an attemptto establisha uni-
versal theory applying to all forms oforganization.
Apart from the break in structural relationsconcomitant with the
Occurrence of World War I, there are some results worthmention.
ing even though they cannot be put into numbers.There is, for
one, the expectation that a study like ours for the timeafter World
War II would probably showeven further loosening of tiesand
still greater diversity of movements, due inpart no doubt to the
still greater monetary autonomies throughoutthe world, inpart to
the powerful economic forces set intomotion for politicalreasons,
e.g., the Marshall Plan and its successors. Thepast (as vel1 as the
present) breakdown of the forms ofmonetary organization_or,
stated in a more neutralmanner, their transformation intonew
shapeshas so much altered thetype of interaction between the
financial markets that,even if we had proof of the correctness of
the classical theory, it wouldnot be easy to prove that it also
applies to the modern forms and what thenew limitations are.
There is furthermore inour researches confirmation of the idea
put forth in Chapter I that financial marketsinteract more intensely
in times of stress and great activity thanin relatively quiet periods.
'l'his can he extended to thecase where economies are not inter-
acting with equal strength sector bysector, whatever the sectors
into which they can be reasonably divided.The financial sectors
are of course among the most active, provided thecountries are
sulficiently far advanced institutionally.The fact we established
that the degree of interactionvaries with the level of activity is,we
believe, not only important in thisfield of study, but is of wider
significance. It should he studied alsofor closed economies where
probably the same fact holds. Thereis not, in a business economy,
only one kind of "dependence"or "interdependence"; there are
many types. Some of these emerge only when theactivity levels
rise, e.g., steelconsumers do not depend as much on the steel
industry in slack times, whenthere are stocks in the hands of
dealers, as in times ofstrong expansion. Others showup when the
levels of activity fall.
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if it hadbeen possible to describe the changes in dependence of
moneymarkets in more detail, we would have learned a gooddeal
about thespread of fluctuations, rather than essentially only about
theirsimultaneous occurrence. Neverthelessthe "effort" series of
Chapter vii doconsiderably more than has hitherto been done
todescribe the phenomenaof changing dependence Chart 28 i
particular tells usabout the relation of a given market with oil
otherssimultaneously, not only with one particularmarket at a
tisne. It gives asmuch information as can be obtainejifrom corn.
bining our datawith a very limited conceptual apparatus.
The changes inthe nature and degree ofdependence are one of
the aspects ofthe spread or diffusionof movements within a system.
They are noteasily determined quantitatively.We may expect
later writers inthis area to provide newand better descriptions and
measurementsof these phenomena,and it may be possible to in.
corporate thesenotions into thegeneral body of economictheory.
We furthermorepoint out that in ourseries we haveindepend-
ently uncoveredall the wellknown international anddomestic
financialdisturbances, but there aremany moreshown that were
not known.It will be thetask of economichistorians to describe
these and toestablish theirsignificance. Even inthe appendix,
which was notdesigned to give morethan generalbackground
material, there arerecords of politicalevents which may verywell
have beenaccompanied bythe disturbancesregistered in our new
data, notably inthe "effort"series, it maybe easier toexplain
these exceptionalpoints in termsof changingdegrees of depend-
ence thanin termsof stable, uniformconnections amongthe whole
series.
(3) Next it isnecessary toreturn once moreto a themerunning
through the entirebookthe natureof the dataand the difficulty
of ascertainingtheir quality. Atthis point areference to thesub-
ject matter isneeded for thefollowing reason:the study hasbeen
broken off inseveral placesprecisely becauseexisting datahad to
be rejectedfor want ofquality, howeverdesirable itwould have
been to treatthe particulararea.The mostnoteworthy andpainful
instance isthe omissionof allstatistics oninternationalgold
movements.This is in thenature of ananomaly in awork in which
gold plays afundamental role.The evaluationof the goldstatistics
has been madeelsewhere;1 theresult wasthat they areUSQ'c " for
'0. Morgenstem,The ValidityofInternational GoldMovementStatidlcs,
Special Papers inInternational Finance,No. 2,International FinanceSection,
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many puiposes, most certainly for ours, which iflVOl\('a
structure imposed by the very nature of the financialroeess
Since gold figures would be the dommant item inbalance ofP.tV- ment statistics, their uselessness also invalidates the latteraggrega
though possibly some other components may remainof interestf
particular purposes. Neither could the investigation beelendj
to include foreign trade, partly because of thevastness of that
undertaking, partly because of the SUSI)iCiOfl thatforeign trad(
data are even worse than those of gold. (Many testshave strengtl
cried the author's firm belief that most of them are.)Apart fro
this, we note that a "balance of trade" is atany rate logicallya
thoroughly unsatisfactory and scientificallyuntenable' concc1)t,i
asmuch as it rests on ilitrely arbitrary decisionsconcerning what to
consider asvisible,"invisible," and acommodity." The mily
satisfactory procedure would be to deal with individualitems of
the whole spectrum from the telegraphictransfers to theiri.
movable real estate, dependingon their specific functions, via
intennediary, economically meaningfulaggregates tothefinal
aggregate ofall paymentsacross borders. This vast undertakimig
was beyond the plans for this book.2
In the same vein there isno point in considerimig a "national
income approach," for example, to diScOVer the relationbetween
foreign investment and its influenceon income in the countries
concerned. The reason isvery simply that for the period thereare
absolutely no useful (lataon hand, that what exists are at best
estimates for larger time intervals thanwe had to consider, and
that the relations between these factorsare still very eontroersja1
On a more abstract theoretical level. The connectionbetween na-
tional incomes, gold points, and short-terminterest rate differentials
is at best rather obscure. Speculationin this area would have been
quite beside the point in this study whenthe classical problems
still offered so fluid) to be clearedtip.
Itis hard to see how anotherstudy could compromise rith
Princetoti University, November 1955. Althoughforeign trade movenwnts wer not part of our investigaL1orI__wiItever thequality of the datagold move-
ments would have l)cen includedeecpt that the data were found wanthi in quality.
2However thstudies now underway at tile National Bureau of Economic












regard tothe data, unless it decreased the degree of detail in the
dcnption ofthe various mechanisms. A real dilemma is posed
econOfltheory has unquestionably postulated a fine structure in
theinternational field; yet we cannot describe it fully enough in all
important directionswith the aid of the data we can gather for the
past. Onecould make broader historical observations, but as a rule
they will notbe such as either to corroborate or to contradict the
theorystatements. For thisthey are too "broad." There is only a
rather narrOWfield where we may reasonably hope to match data
and theory.This is the area of Our investigations,with which we
assumethe reader of thischapter to be quite familiar.
(4) Weshall now show the peculiardifficulty to which our
attempt hasled us and shall enumeratethe alternative decisions
which might bemade. Finally (in 5 below), weshall indicate
that besidesthis rather clear-cutdilemma there is still another
possibility on thehorizon__definite and important, but sofar only
on thehorizon_whihinges on somefundamental prospects of
economics.
Many of ourfindings have runagainst commonsense expectations
orexpectations based onparts of the theoryof international trade.
For example,the cross ratesof exchange behave"irrationally" in
that there areneither zero, norsmall, nor clearly constantdifler-
ences betweenthem and thedirect rates. Thenthere arc the
peculiar lastingdifferences amonginterest rates which wereex-
tensively discussed.But foremostthere is the behaviorof the
exchange rates inregard to the goldpointsa crucialissue. It
was foundthat the ratesfrequently and oftenfor long, continuous
intervals, push pastthe maximumgold points, insofar aswe know
them. In factthe rates arealready monthlyaverages aridtherefore
minor violationsof a day orso__which everyonewould clearly
consider negligible_.arcautomaticallYdisregardFinally the in-
vestigation of ChapterVii, in which alogically soundmethod was
developed andapplied showingthe relativestressesexercised by
moneymarkets, revealedalmost fantasticdliscrepanCSbetween
the observedbehavior of themarkets in respectto eachother and
that postulatedby, andinferred from,the principlesof the gold
standard, even ifthe latter be
formulated in a verywatered40v'u1
fashion. And theseprinciples weresupposedlY mostapplicable for
the major periodwith which wehave beenconcerned'
Thus the dilemmais thefollowing:either wereject thedata
which were usedand questiOflthemaniPlrti0h15 towhich they
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were subjected, or we rejectthe theory which was used in com-
bining and interpreting them. We may of course reject both, in
which case a big, peculiar void opens. These possibilities will ie
discussed briefly in the following order.
First: we reject the data, i.e., those which produce conflict,
and hold on to the theory. Clearly the reader has been made aware
of the error components in the data to an extent perhaps not always
found in writings of this type. Repeated reference to other work
by the author on the problems of accuracy of economic observa.
tions has demonstrated concern, if not skepticism, regarding the
quality of the data commonly used in economics. If the data were
nevertheless used this means that no better could be found and
that no devices became known to test them in any specific manner
for errors of observation. The data, say, of exchange rates were not
rejected as were the statistics of gold movements, because there
was no comparable direct and convincing test for their error corn.
ponent. Neither were there other strong grounds for rejecting them.
The delicate point in this connection is that the (unknown) error
unquestionably increases with each further digit. Yet for exchange
rates and gold points in particular many digits are required to make
the basic, theoretical argument meaningful at all. The violations
of gold points by the exchange rates would be made fewer by using
cruder data for both, i.e., by arbitrarily reducing the number of
digits, but other historical evidence is that operators in the markets
actually did profitably use information involving at least as many
digits as occur in our statistics. Thus it would be improper to drop
digits.
To stay with this example, unquestionably only trivial improve-
ments can be made in our exchange rate statistics; no better exist.
The gold point data could be greatly extended; perhaps even
time series can be constnicted, such as the "effort" series of Tabl
74 and 75. But this would depend on the accident of finding them
scattered in individual records, in bank archives, etc., and come-
quently on the expenditure of very large sums for the search. Even
then, far from making itcertain that the dilemma would be
removed, finer gold point data would increase the chances for
deviations. Thus the decision as to how fine a structure of the
theory to use would become necessary again. The principles for
the construction of the "effort" series would not be changed, since
the underlying logic is not debatable from the point of view of the
data. The deviations these series give from the permissible limitsCONCLUSiON ANDPERSPECTiVE
arefrequently so enormous that only equally modifica.
tkflS inthe data (in the "right" directioni) couldmake a difference.
is hard to seewhere such differentinformation shouldcome
from. Not evenmuch and varying new detailregarding the loan
periodsWhich have such an important influenceupon the deter-
mination of permissible interest differences (cf. Chart 24 and Table
76)_-could turn the trick, although it could produce considerable
changes.
Thus, if we were to go once more step by step through all the
data used in thepreceding chapters, we would hardly succeed in
removing those peculiardiscrepancies with the theoreticalcon-
structs to which wehave related them. Neither can we forget that
there is generalhistorical corroboration of a kind which does not
allow us to become morelenient and to blame our difficulties on our
insistence on maintaining a verystringent attitude.
The explicit treatment of thestochastic properties of the data
belongs in the area of the moreintensive statistico-mathematical
studies viewed as apossibility (cf. Chapter 1, section 2). The
essential feature in the presentinstance would be to determine
probability distributions foreach set of data and then to apply
them to the mechanism inthe manner of the preceding chapters.
This is only a diflerent wayof stating what was discussed in the
above paragraphs.
Second. We reject the theoryand hold on to the facts irrespective
of whether they arepresented as in the earlier chapters orgiven
in the cruder formof fewer digits discussedabove as an alternative.
This would mean that weview the period ofthe classical gold
standard as inadequatelydescribed by the typicalmechanism at
least in one respect: theinteraction between twoand more money
markets via exchange ratesand interest rates isnot nearly as
precise and rigid aspostulated and thecharacteriZati01of the
mechanism is faultyinasmuch as it does notallow for hysteresis
and for spontaneousvarying adjustmentto differentdegrees of
pressure.
Theory would befound to be toofinely trcturCd,since reality
shows much more friction,although thetheoretical formulatiom
have been found quiteconvincing throughthe decadesatleast
by the theorists, whohave made nosignificant changessince the
mechanism was firstdescribed.
This situation isimportant especiallyfrom apractical pointof
view. it has frequentlybeen asserted,mostly in the1980's, that
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the gold standard mechanism imposed a very rigid behavior,a
kind of strait jacket, upon the countries involved in it. Anyun-
pleasant and undesirable variation in coirntry A would force coun-
try B to very rigid, unpleasant, and undesirable readjustments; if
B did not submit to the adjustment, it would cease to remain on the
gold standarda state apparently of overriding significance. The
demands were chiefly for interest i-ate increases, guarantee of free,
unhampered gold exports (after transfer of even more immediately
available resources), and for limited exchange rate movements.
There existed absolute, inviolable bounds.
We see now that our data do not bear out this contention. In-
stead of looking closely at the facts, however, the policy-makers
and critics have simply accepted the theory. Now if we decide
to throw away the theory in its classical form, the political Conse-
quences change correspondingly. A properly described modified
mechanism, giving a correct picture, might have led to less extreme
suggestions than the abolition of the gold standard altogether.
Even in the descriptions of the facts underlying the working of
the mechanism after World War I, there were serious mistakes.
We have seen (Tables 34 and 35) that the gold points were farther
apart in the post-World-War-I period than before, and that their
violations, if occurring at all, were much fewer, although it was
allegedly then that the hardships of the international monetary
organization were most strongly felt.
A modification of the theory, so as to reconcile it with our data,
is not as simple as it may have seemed above. It may seem trivial
to relax requirements by introducing thresholds, time delays, etc.,
but such modifications could easily produce inconsistencies with
other parts of economic theory (for example, that even the smallest
advantages are utilized, especially in the monetary markets) and
with strong institutional evidence (for example, that in arbitrage
dealings operators used several telephones simultaneously in order
to profit from changes in rates of small fractions of 1 per cent).
Consequently the theory cannot very well be stated in terms of
smaller incentives than those actually at work; in ecmomics it is
usually the other way aroundstronger incentivesare the device
used in order to make theory possible at all.
Thus we are left with the disagreeable situation that, ifwe ac-
cept the data and reject the theory, we have noeasy alternative.
Few people will want to be maneuvered into this situation;some-
how we find it easier to stick toa generalization, however obscure
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tjfoundations may be, than to accept new facts or face the
deinoljti0of old ones. The human mind prefers order and rejects
jsagreeable isolated facts, especially when more than one relation
canplausibly be established among them.
Third: the possibility next tobe considered is thatour observa-
tions andmeasurements are not intuitively acceptable, that the
conflicts leading tothe dilemma discussed under the two preceding
headings are spurious,and that in fact there i.s no problem at all,
except tomake a different, and a fortjorj better, selection of data
instead of"improving" these. More precisely: the data which
wereused and the modestmanipulations perfonned on them will
scarcely ever beeliminated from a test of the interaction of money
markets of countries onthe gold standard. it is more likely that a
proper testrequires quite different data, someof which (such as
the "effort"series of Chapter VII)might be derived from our basic
data, others tobe discovered elsewhere. Thiswould mean that
whatever theory wecommand in this area is already so sophisticated
that our obvious,directly accessible data and measurementswill
not be decisive.Indeed the difficulties with thelatter that we
encountered might disappearin the light of the informationflowing
from deeper layersof fact.
This point of viewmust be mentionedfor the sake of coin-
p1etenesS but itwill hardly be found toapply. Unfortunately there
is, for the timebeing, no evidencethat such other facts exist, nor
is it convincingthat our theory is soadvanced that the only orthe
chief data that areneeded lack immediateintuitive appeal. There
are at bestonly more dataof the same kind asalready used (such
as figures onforeign trade,direct investments,movements of gold
and securities, etc.),and reasons weregiven why they werenot
exploited. The onlyfurther possibilityisand the authorbelieves
it to be a promisingonethat a morepenetrating mathematieo
statistical analysisof our material mayproduce surprises.Such a
study does not existat presentand furtherconjectures aboutits
outcome woulddo no good atthis juncture.
In concludingthe discussionof these pointsthis observaU01is
in order: disturbing asthe abovedilemma maybe, it is not atall
undesirable. A mereconfirmation ofwhat wasalready knownand
summarized in the theorywith perhaps some
sharpening offormula-
lion might begratifying in theshort run,but notmuch food for
further thoughtwouki have beenprovided. Nowthis confirmation
is not forthcoming,and we knowat leasthow carefulwe shall
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have to be in this area. If a transmission of fluctuations among
countries is to be studieddearly a t01)iC of everlasting interes.
one cannot do better than to start with thedata-rich fiflaflcjLI field
Thus the troubles laid bare here must influence procedure for
more ambitious undertakings, especiallywhen they are associatI
with more involved theory and more complicated concepts, such
as, for example, net terms of trade, foreign trade multipliers,
propensities to import, propensities to invest abroad, national in-
come comparisons, etc. We stated at the opening of this chapter
that the present book may provide a tool and be a starting point
for such further studies. Now we can even add that future prob-
lems have been pin-pointed. As a rule there is a good chance that
the mere formulation (not to mention the subsequent resolution)
of a sharply defined dilemma actually produces a step forward
(as is frequently the case in science). A clearly seen dilemma
forces us to make decisions.
(5) We shall now point out briefly the possibility of looking
at the situation from a different point of view altogether. So far
we have considered the current views on the equilibrium and the
stability of the gold standard mechanism and its variants. Among
other things we were troubled by the fact that too much precision
was assumed in the reaction of the financial markets to each other,
and we were afraid that modifications might bring about a con-
flict with accepted theory in other fields. It is possible however
that rigor and precision exist in the relationship among money
markets after all, but that for their description we require a
fundamental shift in our notions of "equilibrium" and "stability."
In other words they may have to be replaced by very different
ideas, such as are shown in the theory of games of strategy. Indeed
this is a natural thought, for in the gold standard system we hardly
have the characteristics of a "mechanism," but have instead one
rather simple form of deliberate, willful struggle among the different
markets for funds, among central banks for gold, among these banks
and their domestic commercial banks for gold, among investors for
placement, etc. All the essential requirements of true games of
strategy are there: the interests of the different members of the
international financial community are sometimes opposed and
sometimes parallel to each other; the members do not individually
control the outcome of their struggles, everything dependingon all
their actions. The theory of games has developedan adequate
conceptual scheme for precisely such situations, and this has led
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to verydifferent ideaS of equilibria in terms of which new, fruitful
deScflpti0hlS ofthe interaction of international monetaryinstitutions
arepossible,
In order notto pursue further the implications of these observa-.
tions,only this much will be pointed out: all that we discussed
earlier inthis chapter about the relations between our observations
and thetheoretical devices to explain them was based on the
conventional notions ofmechanism, equilibrium, response, etc. If
however theinteraction of money marketsregardless of whether
static, cyclical orotherwiseis better analyzed in game-theoretical
terms, thefact that data and conventional theory do not tally well
is nothing todeplore. On the cofltTaIY one may take comfort from
this and hopethat the data and the new theory will give the
desired explanation.Since a step of this kind is not likely to be
undertaken in the nearfuture, we limit ourselves here to pointing
out itspossibi1itY essentially toindicate that neither the direction
nor theextent of scientificdevelopment can as a rule be foreseen.
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SUMMARY OF BUSINESS ANN-\I.S
FOR FOUR COUNTRIES
PREWAR
United States and International
1876Decline in railroad stock prices after April; industrial slump,
spring and autumn; bond prices steady; SOfl1C recovery j
exports, imports small
1877Stock prices reach bottom, June; bond prices steady; silver
agitation in Congress, last quarter; increased foreign trade
1878.Silver reinstated as legal tender, February; small imports,
very large exports; Bland-Allison silver purchase act (United
States)
1879Rise in stock prices, especially last four months; increase in
imports
1880Stock market collapse, May, but recovery and boom after
October, especially railroads; advance in bond prices; great
activity in foreign trade
1881Peak reached by railroads in May. and industrials in June;
large issues of new securities; slight decline in foreign trade;
assassination of Tsar Alexander II
1882Boom in imports, decline in exports; temporary boom in
stock prices, summer
1883Increased exports; smaller imports; decline in railroad stocks
and industrials
1884Panic, May; bank failures, decline in stocks; reduction in
foreign trade
188Silver agitation; further decline in foreign trade
1886Some improvement in foreign trade and stock market
1887Tremendous railroad construction and western real estate
boom; larger imports
1888Unfavorable balance of trade
1889Favorable balance of trade; enormous volume of activity
1890Financial strain in November with failure of banks and
brokers; passage of Sherman silver purchase act, July; very
active foreign trade
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J91_Foreign trade expansion, especially exports
1892_Silver agitation; active foreign trade, especially imports
1893_Violent panic, May; crisis most severe, August; repeal of
silver purchase act, August
1894-_Reduction in foreign trade; many failures; coal anti railroad
strikes, summer; Chinese-Japanese War, July 25
1895__Difficu1tieS with Great Britain over Venezuela, December;
revival of imports
1896__Victory for gold standard; expansion of exports, falling off
of imports; Kiondike gold discoveries
1897Higher prices of stocks and bonds; rates raised by Dingley
tariff, August
1898__Declaratiofl of war with Spain, April; peace declared, August;
unprecedented exports
1899Wild speculation on stock exchange, panic, December; in-
crease in imports
1900-_Formal establishment of goldstandard, March; large foreign
trade
1901Stock exchange panic, May;Northern Pacific corner; copper
market collapse, December
1902_increase in imports,decline in exports; declining bond prices;
coal strike, May to October
1903__Numerouscommercial failures; exports large
1904_Collapse of Sully cotton corner;increase in imports
1905Foreign trade expansion;Russo-Japanese War, February to
September
1906San Franciscoearthquake and fire, April; increasein foreign
trade
1907_Failure ofKnickerbocker Trust Company,October; stock
exchange collapse,March, August; recordimports and ex-
ports
1908Copper and cottonspeculation; manyrailroad receiverships;
foreign trade restricted
1909imports revive, exportsdecline; increase intariff rates
1910Fall in stock andbond prices; increasein foreign trade
1911_Decreased imports,increased exports;dissolution ofStand-
ard Oil and AmericanTobacco orderedby Supreme Court,
May
1912Large increasein foreigntrade; Balkan War,winter
1913_EstabliShmc1t ofFederal ReserveSystemDecember; de-
crease in importSincrease inexports
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Great Britain
l876Wide fluctuations in price of silver;large reductionin ex- ports
1877Anxiety caused by Russian-Turkishwar, March;annexation of Transvaal
1878Important bank failures causingdistress in October;Af- ghanistan war, September; furtherreduction in foreigntrade, especially imports
1879End of Afghanistanwar, May; revival in exports
ISSOForeign trade boom
l8SlSlump in securityprices, August
l882Fall in silver; Egyptiantroubles; increase inforeign trade
l883Egyptian occupation; increasedimports, smallerexports
1884Rand discoveries in SouthAfrica; slump in foreigntrade l885Creat decline in priceof silver; reduction inforeign trade 1886-_Fall in price of silverhalted, August; Transvaalgold rush; low point reached inforeign trade
l887Fall in securityprices, first half, and thenrise
l888Stock market active withrising prices, especiallyBritish rail- roads; increase in foreigntrade
l889Advance in securityprices; active gold miningspeculation; increase in foreign trade
189OCollapse of stock marketprices, November; failure ofBarich Bros.
l89IReduction in foreigntrade
1892Reduction in foreigntrade
l893Austrajjan crises, April,American troubles, October;drop in stock exchangeprices; decline in foreigntrade
1894Speculatjve boom inSouth African shares latein year l895Coflapse of SouthAfrican boom,September; increase in foreign trade
l896Rise in securityprices, autumn; increasein foreign trade 1897Rise in stockprices to Novemberand then drop; increased
imports, smallerexports
l898Strained relationshipwith Franceover spheres of influence in West Africa andFashoda inupper Egypt; Sudan re-
conquest, November
1899Peak reachedin securityprices, July; declaration of Boer war, October;reverses, November andDecember; increase in foreign trade
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Rapid rise inindustrial stocks, first quarter; boomin Ameri-
can railways
1901__CollapSe of Northern Pacific corner; American railways
boom, May; peak reached in industrial stocks, March, rapid
decline; decline in value, not volume, of foreign trade
1902_Falling prices on stock market; end of Boer war, May
190S__Bevival in foreigntrade
lg04_DifficUlt115 with Russia over attacks on neutral shipping
1905_Rise instock prices; big increase in exports
1906__Collapse in stockmarket early in year, but revival last
quarter; record expansionof foreign trade
l9O7_Fifla11cstringency, autumn; stock exchange slump with
failure, June
l9O8_Somerevival in summer in South American securities; large
reduction in volumeof foreign trade
1909_Kaffir rubberboom
i910_-Stock marketcollapse, summer; expansion of foreigntrade
1911_Retard in expansionof foreign trade








188O_DiSPute withItaly over Tunis;floating of companyfor
construction ofPanama Canal
1881_French occupationof Tunis,November; adoptionof tarifi
system
1882__SeVeIefinancialcrisis,September andOctober; security
speculation collapsewith boursepanic, January;foreign trade
dull
1883__Cofltiflual panicsand scares,security pricesvery low
1884_Decline ofsecurity prices;reduction offoreign trade
1885_Smaller foreigntrade
1886_._SeCuritY pricesrise; some increasein foreigntrade
1887Activespeculation despiteboursedifficulties
1888Activespeculation
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1889Bourse collapses with Panama Canal failure, January; l)rck_
(tOWn of copier corner and failure of C tuptoir (lLScflinjfle,
March; marked revival in foreign trade
1891Banking difficulties, March; alliance with Iissia;imports
reach peak
1892Marked reduction in foreign trade; l'rencli vork starttjon
Panama Canal, January 20; Panama Canal scandal in FraI)CC
1893Anarchist uprisings
1894Carnot assassinated, June; low 1x)int reached in foreign trade
1895Speculative boom in gold mining shares leading to minor
panic, last quarter
1896.Easy money, dull stock exchange; creation of Madagasetr
as French colony
l897Increasing stock market activit, rising prices and foreign
trade
1898Difficulty with Great Britain over Fashoda
1899Relations with Britain strained;securityl)ri('Cs(lVCljfle
foreign trade booms
1900Paris Exposition, spring; high point reached in foreign trade
I901Foreign trade restricted
l902Some revival in foreign trade
l903Some revival in foreign trade
1904Slight pamc. stock exchange, February
19(bRelations with Germany strained over Morocco
1906Dispute with Germany settled; foreign trade booms,un-
favorable balance
907Decline in security prices
1908Decline in foreign trade
lOO9Rising values on hotirse
1910Decline in security pnccs, especially bonds; foreign trade
very active
191 1Threat of war with Germany
1912Panic on bourse, October; foreign tradevery active
l9l3War in Northern Africa; record foreign trade
Germa nq
lS76\fininMirn reached in securityprices
1877Bank failures and fiscal difficultjs fromgold speculation;
stock exchange disturbed by Russian-Turkishvar; increase
in exportsCHRONOLOGY
1878Reduced imports,larger exports
j819Failure ofHamburg bankers: tariff imposed mimports
1880Bigreduction in imports
1881Botirsebooms; increased foreign trade
1882Increase inforeign trade
1883Declining stockprices; increase in foreign trade checked
1884Declining stock prices
1885Reduction in foreign trade
1886Revival in stock prices
1887Speculation in stocks;active foreign trade
1888Temporary relapsecaused by speculation, autumn; growing
foreign trade
1889Bourse boom;boom in imports, decline in exports
1890Security marketdepressed
1891Berlin hank panicand failures, November
1891Declining values onbourse; decrease in foreign trade
1893Decrease inforeign trade
1894Revival inbourse; revival in imports
1895Cold miningstock boom, collapse instock prices, November;
revival in exports
1896Beginning ofperiod of markedincrease in foreign trade
1897Marked increasein foreign 'ade
1898Marked increasein foreign trade
1899Revival ofspeculation on bourse;increase in foreign trade
1900Collapse instock prices afterApril, many bankfailures and
minor panic,December; adoptionof gold standard,large
foreign trade
1901Financialdifficulties andbank failures, summer;reduction
in foreigntrade
1902Some revival inforeign trade
1903-_Rising stockprices; markedincrease inforeign trade
1904Panic, February;importantfailures
1905Strained relationswith Francelast ninemonths; greatbourse
activity
1906Some pricedecline onbourse;settlement ofdispute with
France overMorocco; markedincrease inforeign trade
l907Declining stockprices; manyfailures; foreigntrade active
1908Advance in securityprices;reduction inforeign trade
l9O9Beginuing ofbourse boom,September;revival offoreign
trade
1910Revival of bourse,summer;marked increasein foreigntrade
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1911Decline instockprices,autumn; Moroccandifficulties
France, beginning in autumn, settled November
1912Bourse panic. October; expansion of foreign trade




1919Versailles Treaty signed; League of Nations established
1919-1922--Vilna dispute
1919-1920--Teschen conflict; Polish-Russian war
l921Rapallo treaty
1921 (November)-1922 (February)Washington Armaments Liju-
itation Conference
1925Nine Power treaties (limiting armaments); Locarno treaty
1926Sharp drop of Belgian franc, Italian lire
1927Civil war in China
1928Kellogg.Briand anti-war treaty
l930Operations begun by Bank for International Settlements
1932-_Beginning of Japanese hostilities in China; suicide of Swedish
financier Kreuger
1933World Economic Conference, London
1934Beginning of Italo-Ethiopian hostilities
1935Economic sanctions against Italy
l936Beginning of Spanish civil war; Triparititecurrency agree-
ment
l937Hostilities in China renewed by Japan
1938Munich pact; occupation of Austria and Sudetenland by
German troops
1939End of Spanish fighting; occupation of Czechoslovakia by
Germany; invasion of Albania, by Italy; Japanese-Russian
troops in irregular hostilities; beginning of World War II
UnitedSlates
1919Postwar boom; United States prohibitionlaw effective; steel
strike; soft-coal strike
1920Collapse of postwar boom inspring




McCumber tariff (highest to date)
1923Prosperity in early part of year followed bYCessiOn; Eng
lish war debt arrangement
1924Mild depression
1925Anthracite coal strike(July 19ZS-Febm1928)
1926Collapse of Floridaland boom
1928Start of greatboom of 1928-192g
1929Federal Reserve"moral SUasiOn" Policy; New York Stock
Exchange collapse
1930Smoot-Hawley tariff (highest inhistory)
1931Hoover moratorium on wardebts and reparatio
I9timson nonrecognitiondoctrine toward Japanese activities
in China;Reconstruction Finance Corporation (RFC) estalj-
lished; war debtdefaults
1933Bank holidays; startof New Deal; gold calledfl; gold
exports banned;gold-clause in bonds abrogated; establish-
ment of TennesseeValley Authority (WA); banking act;
Home Owners' LoanAct (HOLC); Securities andExchange
Commission Act(SEC); National IndustrialRecovery Act
(NIRA), voidedMay 1935; AgriculturalAdjustment Act
(AM)
1934Stabilization ofdollar at $35 per ounceof gold; establish-
ment ofExchange StabilizationFund; Johnson debtdefault
act; reciprocaltariff act; silverpurchase bill; textilestrikes;
Federal DepositInsurance Corporationact (FDIC)
1935Gold clauseabrogation upheldby Supreme Court;Wagner
labor relations act;social securitylegislation; publicutility
holding company act
1938Reserverequirementsraised by FederalReserve Board;





formulation of newspending program
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1924Labor government; conservative government
1925Return to gold standard; coal strike (July l925-Novemkr
1926); removal of gold export prohibition
l926Ceneral strike
1927Trade agreement with Soviet Russia
1928End of rubber restriction scheme
1929Second MacDonaki cabinet; Hatry collapse
1930Naval reduction treaty (London)
1931Cold standard dropped by Britain; Statute of Westminster
1932Protective tariff (end of free trade); embargo on new capital
issues; Ottawa empire preference agreements in effect; cx.
change equalization fund
1 934Commercial agreement with France
1935Conservative victory (Baldwin)
1936Abdication of Edward VIII





1923Inflationarv prosperity; occupation of Ruhr 1w French and
Belgian troops
1924Full cniplovrnent, hut tmstal)le(inflationary)l)rOsPeritY:
beginning of evacuation of Ruhr Iw French
1925Prosperity, but soaring prices
1926Sharp drop of franc
1928.Franc stabilized
1929Large gold inflows, following franc stal)ilization
1931French pressure resultinginfailureofCreditAnstalt
(Austria)
1933_Exposure of Stavisky frauds
1934Stavisky riots; textile strikes




tø._FopurFront economic reform legislation-_forty hourweek,





1919_AlIied blockadelifted; Weimar constitution adopted
1g()__Continued unrest and riots
1gl_Sprmgrevival
19__RapailO Treatywith Soviet Russia; end of revival in summer
l923__Bavarianrevolt crushed; collapse of mark; Rentenbank
opened
1024_Acceptance ofDawes reparation plan
1925._Tariff increases;ratification of Locarno treaty
1927_Prosperity andthen drop due to Reichsbank curb on specu-
lation
l928_ReceSsion
l929__ReceSSiofl,despite spring upturn;Young reparations plan
1930_-Gain byNazis in elections




1935__Retum ofSaar to Cermany;conscription restored; export




occupied; attack onPoland; outbreak of
World War 11
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